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Bankers Trust I: Underwriting,
Commercial Paper Placement, and
the Risk of Loss Under
the Glass-Steagall Act
[Tihe purpose of this legislation is to protect the people
of the United States in the right to have banks in which their

deposits will be safe. They have a right to expect of Congress
the establishment and maintenance of a system of banks in the
United States where citizens may place their hard earnings with
reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again

upon demand.*
INTRODUCTION

The financial industry is undergoing a period of great change
and uncertaintyI Even before the stock market crash of 19
October 1987, commercial banks2 experienced depressed profits3

* 77 CoNG. REc. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall).

The stock market crash of 19 October 1987 amply illustrates this observation.
See Stocks Plunge 508 Points,A Drop of 22.6%, N.Y. Times, October 20, 1987, at 1
(nat'l ed.).
2 Commercial banks are those institutions chartered to receive deposits subject to
repayment, make loans, discount and negotiate promissory notes, and perform other
activities related to deposit banking. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629
(1971); see Warren v. Shook, 91 U.S. 704, 710 (1875) ("Having a place of business
where deposits are received and paid out on checks, and where money is loaned upon
security, is the substance of the business of a banker."). For a thorough discussion of
the distinction between banks and nonbanks, see generally Note, Independent Bankers
Association v. Conover: Nonbank Banks Are Not in the Business of Banking, 35 Am.
U.L. Ray. 429 (1985-86).
See Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of U.S.-CharteredInsured Commercial
Banks in 1985, 72 FED. RasmvE BuLL. 618, 618 (1986) ("After a five-year decline, the
aggregate profitability of insured commercial banks turned somewhat higher in 1985
but [was] still well -below [its] 1979 peak.
"); Opper, Profitability of Insured CommercialBanks in 1982, 69 FED. RwsERvE BuLL. 489, 489 (1983) ("[I]n 1982
[r]eported
profits edged down further from -the 1979 peak, and returns on assets and on equity
reached lows last observed in the recovery from the 1973-75 recession.").
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and shifting markets. 4 In the period between 1972 and 1982, the
market share of the flow of credit controlled by depository

institutions declined 38.1 percentage points. 5 After an increase
to 11.33 percent return on equity in 1985,6 profits of commercial
banks again fell to 10.23 percent return on equity in 1986. 7 In

1981, banks represented only two of the top five consumer
lenders of retail mortgage, consumer installment, and revolving
8

loans.
In addition to declining profits and shifting markets, commercial banks also face competition from outside the commercial
banking industry One of the most significant new developments
within the securities business was the 1979 introduction of the
Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account. The Cash Management Account offers weekly declared dividends on a mutual
fund account, third-party check writing privileges, and a credit
card which supplies a line of credit equal to the amount by
which securities deposited with Merrill Lynch could be mar-

gined. 9 This activity directly competes with checking accounts

4 F OPPER, SEcuarrias Acrrvrrms OF Co
RciAL BANKs 48 (1981) ("[B]anks
are clearly losing their share of mumcipal securities. This loss is largely because New
York City's problems and Proposition 13-type initiatives have made the issuance of
general obligation bonds more difficult.").
I [D]epository institutions captured 70 percent of the flow of credit in
1972. In contrast, the market share of depository financial institutions was
45.4 percent in 1979, 44.2 percent in 1980, and only 31.9 percent in
1982.
There is evidence to suggest that the financial innovations developed in recent periods may have permanently reduced the market share
of depository financial institutions.
K. COOPER & D. FRASER, BANKING DEREGuLATio AND THE NEw CoPEmaTpioN IN
FINANcIAL SERVICEs 4 (1984).
6 See Danker & McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 618.
7 Danker & McLaughlin, Profitability of U.S.-Chartered Insured Commercial
Banks in 1986, 73 FED. REsER E Buu.. 537 (1987).
1 K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 5, at 199-200 (citing Rosenblum & Siegel,
Competition in FinancialServices: The Impact of Nonbank Entry, 83-1 FEDERAL RESERvE
BANK OF CHICAGO, STAr STuDy, at 17) (As of December 31, 1981, the top consumer
lenders of retail mortgage, consumer installment, and revolving loans were: 1) General
Motors through its General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 2) BankAmerica Corporation, 3) Citicorp, 4) Sears, and 5) Ford Motor Company.); see E. BOWDEN & J.
HOLBERT, REVOLUTION IN BANKING 245 (2d ed. 1984) (In the first part of the 1980's,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation "had more consumer installment credit outstanding than the three biggest banks in the nation.").
I M. STiGmm, Tan MONEY MARKET 683 (1983).
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offered by commercial banks.10 The corporate combinations of
non-bank financial institutions"l and the spread of multi-national
banking 12 have also greatly increased the competitive atmosphere
13
for commercial banks.

As a result of these competitive pressures and m spite of the
Congress' long established policy of separating commercial banking from investment banking,1 4 the banking industry has in-

The name Merrill gave to its new account, introduced m 1979, was Cash
Management Account (CMA); the bells and whistles on this new account,
which requires a nummum deposit of $20,000 in cash or securities, are (1)
a CMA checking account (with checks cleared through Bank One of
Georgia) that pays interest at money market rates, (2) a weekly sweep of
momes coming from a client's brokerage account into his CMA account,
and (3) a free VISA card with a line of credit equal to the full amount by
which any securities the client has deposited with Merrill could be margined.
Id. The banking community argues that the use of margin security credit as a source of
capital for making commercial loans to margin account customers, accessible with a
bank credit card and in combination with a money-market fund, is essentially the
equivalent of deposit banking. Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97
BANmcNo L.J. 631, 636 (1980). For an informative discussion of the relation of money
market mutual funds to the separation of the commercial banking and investment
banking industries, see generally Adams, Money Market Mutual Funds: Has GlassSteagall Been Cracked?, 99 BANING L.J. 4 (1982).
20 See K. CooPER & D. FRAsER, supra note 5, at 5.
1 The financial services revolution has recently entered an accelerated phase
with the acquisition of major investment banking concerns by two of the
nation's largest nonbanking financial institutions, which are equal in size
to the very largest U.S. banks and provide most of the bank's services.
The two combined institutions, American Express-Shearson Loeb Rhoades
and Prudential-Bache, illustrate, with graphic clarity, the enormous size,
power and geographic scope of the nonbanking financial service companies.
Competition and Conditions in the FinancialSystem: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 238, 243 (1981)
(statement of Gordan T. Wallis, Pres., N.Y. Clearing House Ass'n).
11"Many large U.S. banks either own or are closely affiliated with foreign investment banking firms and thereby engage in such traditionally prohibited activities as
the underwriting and dealing in corporate bonds and stocks." Edwards, Banks and
Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectives on the Glass-SteagallAct, in Tim
DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUsTiUEs 273-74 (1979).
'3 See K. COOPER & D. FRAsER, supra note 5, at 99 ("[F]oreign banks have
initiated or expanded U.S. operations in order to
obtain a new source of dollars by
competing for deposits."); E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GtL, & R. SmrrH, COMIERCIAL
BANKING, 14 (1984) (Competition from sales compames and consumer finance companies
appeared in the late 1970s, "but it was not until the early 1980s that Congress responded
to the demands of commercial banks for a 'more level playing field' and permitted
banks to offer money market accounts and brokerage services.").
14 Passed after the bank paic of 1933, the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall
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creased its efforts to expand services into securities related
activities. 15 Recent developments include investment advisor services to closed-ended investment companies, 16 discount brokerage
services,'17 money market deposit accounts, 8 and Super-NOW

accounts. 9 The money market deposit accounts quickly proved
to be quite successful, exceeding $370 billion in total deposits
20
just over one year after their introduction.
One particular struggle in the banking industry has taken
place over the private placement of securities by banks to a
Act) "separated commercial and investment banking, gave-increased regulatory authority
to the Federal Reserve System, prohibited payment of interest on demand deposits, and
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)." K. COOPER & D.
FRASER, supra note 5, at 51; see infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
" Recent activities which test the limits of current regulation include collectively
managed agency accounts, automatic investment services, dividend reinvestment plans,
individual portfolio management services, advisory services to investment companies,
and private placement services for issuers of securities. Edwards, supra note 12, at 274;
see K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 5, at 210'("The best example of banking
organizations seeking new product lines perhaps is the expansion into discount brokerage."); see generally Securities Industry Association, Public Policy Issues Raised by
Bank Securities Activities, 20 SAN. Dic_,o L. Ray. 339 (1982-83) (discussing conflict
between banking and securities industries).
11 See generally Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst.,
450 U.S. 46 (1981) [hereinafter IC1] (Bank holding companies and nonbanking subsidiaries acting as investment advisors to closed-ended investment companies violate neither
the language of the Glass-Steagall Act nor the Bank Holding Company Act.).
'1 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207 (1984) [hereinafter Schwab] (The Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act permit BankAmerica's acqunsition of Charles Schwab, a retail discount
brokerage.).
"1Authorized by the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (hereinafter
DIDC), under the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, the money
market deposit account (hereinafter MMDA) consists of an FDIC insured money market
fund which allows six transactions per month, three of which may be made by check.
M. STi um, supra note 9, at 681. One advantage of the MMDA over most money
market mutual funds is that no required minmum exists for checks written against the
MMDA. K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 5, at 133-34. In addition, as of January
1, 1986, no mimmum balance requirement exists for the MMDA itself. Id. at 133.
9 The Super-NOW account (negotiated order of withdrawal) was also authorized
by the DIDC under the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The
DIDC allowed depository institutions to-offer an account with unregulated interest rates
and with unlimited checking. Like the MMDA, the Super-NOW account required a
$2500 minimum balance. "In contrast to the MMDA, which is treated as a savings
account for reserve requirement purposes, the Super-NOW account [acts] as a transactions account and came[s] a 12 percent reserve requirement." K. COOPER & D. FRAsER,
supra note 5, at 134; see M. STGums, supra note 9, at 681.
20 K. COOPER & D. FRASER, supra note 5, at 133, 141.
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limited number of sophisticated investors. 2 1 Because of their
frequent contacts with corporate banking customers, commercial
banks are "umquely equipped" to serve as financial intermedi-

aries in these placements, to bring buyers and sellers together,
and to negotiate terms of the transactions.? At least with regard

to commercial paper securities3 that are placed by banks, the,
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit in Securities Industry Association v Board
of Governors of the FederalReserve System (Bankers Trust 11)24
resolved the conflict.

21

Note, CommercialBank PrivatePlacement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall,27

CATH. U.L. REv. 743, 745'(1978). Sophisticated investors for securities-related purposes
are those investors who do not need the protection of the 1933 Securities Act, because
they are in such a position with respect to the issuer that they actually have, or have
access to, the information a registration statement under the Act would disclose. See
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Punna Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953).
2
Note, supra note 21, at 745. A study by the Federal Reserve Board [hereinafter
FRB] described private placement advisory services as follows:
making recommendations regarding the terms and the timing of the transaction; assisting in the preparation of the financing documents; contacting
a limited number of potential institutional investors; arranging meetings
between the issuer and potential investors; and assisting in subsequent
negotiations.
[T]he issuer has responsibility for providing financial and
operating data, the accuracy of which is typically subject to independent
review by the investor in analyzing the issuer's financial soundness and
future prospects. The final contract is signed by the investor and. the issuer,
and the proceeds of the sale go directly to the issuer.
Golden, CorporateLaw for FinancialInstitutions, 102 BANKING L.J. 483, 484 (1985)
(citing FED. RESERVE BD. STAFF STUDY, COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT Acnvrrms 27 (1977)).
11 " 'Commercial paper' refers generally to unsecured, short-term promissory notes
issued by commercial entities. Such a note is payable to the bearer on a stated maturity
date. Maturities vary considerably, but typically are less than nine months." Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 468 U.S, 137, 140 n.1 (1984)
[hereinafter Bankers Trust 1]. Consistent with the short maturity of commercial paper,
the proceeds must be used in "producing, purchasing, carrying, or marketing goods,"
"meeting current operating expenses," or "carrying current operating obligations of the
United States." G. Mme & F GAgciA, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 196
(8th ed. 1983); see J. HAwKE, JR., CoMMENTARIES ON BANKING REGuLAToN 153 (1985)
("Commercial paper-prime quality, unsecured short-term promissory notes issued by
large business corporations-trades in the nation's money markets at rates that may be
competitive with such money market instruments as large negotiable. certificates of
deposit, bankers acceptances and Treasury obligations.").
- 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) [hereinafter
Bankers Trust I1.
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The origin of the complex litigation leading up to Bankers

Trust II began in 1978, when Bankers Trust Company, a New
York-chartered member bank of the Federal Reserve System,
began placing the commercial paper of several of its corporate

customers.Y In January of 1979, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), a national securities industry trade association,
and A.G. Becker, Inc., a dealer in commercial paper, petitioned

2
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) 6

to prohibit Bankers Trust from placing commercial paper. 27 SIA
and Becker alleged that Bankers Trust's activities violated the

Glass-Steagall Act. 28 In a September, 1980, statement, the FRB
ruled that because the commercial paper being placed by Bankers
Trust was not a security for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act,

the "restrictions of the Act against underwriting and dealing in
securities thus do not apply "29 SIA and Becker sought judicial
review of the FRB's ruling in the Uited States District Court
for the District of Columbia, which reversed the agency's decision. 30 After the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reinstated the FRB's ruling, 3' the FRB was reversed
by the Uited States Supreme Court in Securities Industry As-

sociation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

" Bank Sale of Third Party Commercial Paper Does Not Violate Glass-Steagall
Act, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 98,435 (Sept. 26, 1980)
[hereinafter September 1980 Statement].
26 The Federal Reserve System includes the 12 Federal Reserve banks and their 25
branches, 37 automated clearinghouses, and 46 regional check processing centers; national banks; state-chartered banks and trust companies which elect to become members
of the system; and other depository institutions "brought under the jurisdiction of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for reporting and reserve maintenance
purposes." G. MuNN & F GARciA, supra note 23, at 365. The Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System is responsible for the general supervision and coordination
of the Federal Reserve System, including the determnation of discount rates charged by
the Federal Reserve Banks on their discounts and advances, the supervision of mergers
and consolidations, and the regulation of bank securities-related activities. Id. at 347,
350.
See September 1980 Statement, supra note 25, at 84,749.
2s Id. at 84,750.
n Id.
3 A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F Supp.
602 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
31 A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d
136 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
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The Supreme Court held that commercial

paper was a security under the Glass-Steagall Act, and therefore
subject to the Act's prohibitions on the underwriting of securi-

ties. 33 On remand, the FRB decided that although commercial

paper was a security for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act, the
activities of Bankers Trust constituted "selling activities" 34 expressly exempted from the Act's general prohibitions against the

selling, underwriting, or distribution of securities, and therefore
were not prohibited by Glass-Steagall. 35 After the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated this FRB
ruling, 36 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, and upheld the FRB ruling in Bank-

ers Trust II, the final disposition of the action.3 7 The Supreme
38
Court demed certiorari on the matter.
The Bankers Trust H opinion, written by Judge Bork, held

that the FRB reasonably approved the placement of commercial
paper by Bankers Trust.3 9 The court examined Bankers Trust's

32

468 U.S. 137.

Id. at 139-40. For enlightemng discussion of Bankers Trust I, see Note, Banking
Law-CommercialPaperis a Security Under the Glass-SteagallAct-Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 104 S. Ct. 2979
(1984), 1985 ARiz. ST. L. REv. 799 (1985).
34
[Tihe Board concludes that Bankers Trust's placement of commercial paper as described in this Statement does not constitute the "selling,"
"underwriting," or "distributing" of commercial paper securities for purposes of the Act. The Board finds that Bankers Trust's commercial paper
operations are selling activities that are expressly authorized by the Act,
since the bank places commercial paper only as an agent of the issuer, not
directly or indirectly for its own account, and the paper is placed without
recourse against the bank and solely on the order of the customer, the
issuer of the paper.
Fed. Reserve Sys., Applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to the Commercial Paper
Placement Activities of Bankers Trust Co., [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 86,270, at 90,836 (June 4, 1985) [hereinafter June 1985 Statement].
31 Id. at 90,823.
6Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F
Supp. 695 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3228 (1987).
3Bankers
Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1052.
" Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807
F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987).
1,Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1069-70. In reviewing the FRB decision, the court
of appeals deternmned that it owed the agency's decision " 'the greatest deferrence.' "
Id. at 1056 (quoting ICI, 450 U.S. 46, 56 (1981)). The court also determined that since
3
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placement activities on three levels. First, since commercial paper
was a security for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act, the court
determined whether Bankers Trust's activities fell within the limited exception for "selling" securities established by section 16 of
the Act. 40 Second, the court resolved whether Bankers Trust's

activities constituted "underwriting," in which case they would
not fall within the protection of section 16 .4 Third, the court
determined whether the activities approved by the FRB gave rise
to '"subtle hazards" in light of the policies of the Act42 as inter-

preted by the Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute v
Camp.43 The Court of Appeals concluded that although some of
the hazards outlined in Camp were present, the FRB reasonably
determined that Bankers Trust's placement activities, fell within
the permissive language of section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act
permitting sales of securities and did not violate the language
prohibiting the "underwriting" of securities. 4 This Comment will
examine the Bankers Trust II decision and the court of appeals!
three-part analysis in applying the Glass-Steagall Act to the commercial paper activities of Bankers Trust Company
I.

Tm GLAss-STEAGALL ACT

Two weeks after the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,
and within the first hundred days of Roosevelt's presidency, 45 the

"Congress has not clearly addressed the question of' whether activities such as those
conducted by Bankers Trust fall within the prohibitions of the [Glass-Steagall] Act,"
the FRB's ruling must be reasonable in light of Congressional silence. Id., see Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 ("[When]
the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit
a court may not substitute its own construction for the reasonable mterpretation made by the admmstrator of an agency.") (emphasis added), reh'g denied, 468
U.S. 1227 (1984).
40 Id. at 1058-62; see infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
4 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062-66; see infra notes 103-54 and accompanying
text.
42 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1066-69; see infra notes 155-80 and accompanying
text.
43

401 U.S. 617 (1971).

Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1069-70.
The Securities Act of 1933 was signed by President Roosevelt on May 27, 1933.
M. PARIUSH, SEcumnms REGmUATION AND T- NEW DE. 70 (1970). The Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933 was signed by President Roosevelt on June 16, 1933. S. KEnNEDY, THE
BA x-wuoC=usES OF 1933 222 (1973).
"

41
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Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to protect commercial banks and
their depositors, 46 and to prevent any repetition of the extensive
bank closings that occurred during the Great Depression. 47 The
1933 Congress believed that their "fixed purpose" was to ensure
that deposits were not "diverted into speculative operations by
the aggressive and promotional character of the investment banking business. '"48 "The failure of the Bank of Uited States in
1930, widely attributed to that bank's securities activities, was
cited as proof that the soundness of the entire banking system
' 49
had been eroded by bank involvement in the securities markets."
In essence, Congress sought to accomplish three basic goals through
the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act: to restore public confidence in the safety of banks as depository institutions; 50 to eliminate potential conflicts of interest that arise when commercial
banks enter the securities business; 51 and to make commercial
banks more financially sound and susceptible to less risk. 52

"New York Clearing House Ass'n, CommercialBank PrivatePlacementAdvisory
Services: The Legal and Public Policy Issues, 95 BANYxWG L.J. 333, 341 (1978).
47 "From
June 30, 1929 to June 30, 1933, the number of commercial banks
declined from 24,970 to 14,208, and total bank deposits dropped 35 percent (from $49.4
billion to $32.1 billion)." K. COOPER & D. FRAsER, supra note 5, at 50; see Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
Congress was persuaded that speculative activities, partially attributable to
the connection between commercial banking and investment banking, had
contributed to the rash of bank failures.
[F]irms affiliated with banks
had engaged in perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and
maintainng a market for the bank's own stock, often with the bank's
resources.
Id. at 61-62 (footnotes omitted).
41 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 632 (1971) (citing 75 CoNG. REc.
9884 (1932)) (remarks of Senator Glass).
41 Note, supra note 21, at 748.
10 lanni, "Security" Under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Act
of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of the Supreme Court's Analysis, 100 B ING L.J.
100, 103 (1983); see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 150 (1984) [hereinafter Bankers Trust 1] ("Congress enacted the
Glass-Steagall Act as one of several pieces of legislation collectively designed to restore
public confidence in financial markets."); H.R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., ist Sess. 6-7
(1933) ("We must resume the use of bank credit if we are to find our way out of our
present difficulties.
'Credit will not expand again until confidence is restored.' ")
(statement of Dr. Thomas Nixon Carver).
" Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-31.
,2Russel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 479 F.2d 131, 133-34 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973); see Ianm, supra note 50, at 103; Note, supra
note 21, at 747.
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The provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act primarily responsible
for the separation of commercial and investment banking are
found in sections 16 and 21 of the Act.53 Section 16 provides in
relevant part:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national
bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities
and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and
the [national bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities
or stock.5 4

Section 21(a)(1) of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that it is
unlawful "for any person
or ..
organization, engaged in
the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks,
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the
in the business of receiving deposits. 5' same time
As the Supreme Court has observed, Congress sought
"[t]hrough flat prohibitions
'to separat[e] as completely as
possible commercial from investment banking.' "56
II.

A.

DIscussIoN

Private Placement as "Selling" Commercial Paper

53 Note, Securities Under the Glass-SteagallAct: Analyzing the Supreme Court's
Frameworkfor Determining PermissibleBank Activity, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 1194, 1197
(1985). Section 20 of the Act prohibits affiliates of member banks from being "engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities.
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982). In addition, section 32 of the Act prohibits member banks from
having director, officer, or employee interlocks with companies "primarily engaged" in
the securities business. Id. at § 78.
Id. at § 24 (Seventh). Section 16 creates several exceptions to the general
prohibition against underwriting and dealing in securities. For example, a national bank
may underwrite and deal in obligations of the United States, general obligations of states
or political subdivisions of states, and obligations of or guaranteed by certain government
agencies. Id. State member banks are also subject to the same limitations and the same
exemptions of this section. Id. at § 335.
Id. at § 378(a)(1).
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 147 (citing Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 450 U.S. at 70).
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Because commerical paper is a security for purposes of the
Glass-Steagall Act,5 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Bankers Trust 11 first determined whether

Bankers Trust's activities fell within the "pernussive language"
of section 16. 5 If a particular sale of securities meets the requirements of section 16, then the activity cannot be prohibited by

section 21's broad pronouncements against "issuing, underwrit' 59
ing, selling, or distributing.
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act allows banks to sell

securities provided that (1) the securities are not sold for the
bank's own account, (2) the securities are bought or sold without

recourse to the bank, and (3) the bank acts solely on the order
and for the account of a customer. 60 Before addressing this
"pernussive language," the court first decided that the "business
of dealing in securities" language in section 16 was not limited

to the secondary trading market. 61 The Bankers Trust II court
concluded that under the guidelines established by the FRB,

Bankers Trust's placement activities were not for the bank's
account;6 2 that section 16 did not require a preexisting customer
relationship; 31 and that the advertising and soliciting activities of

- See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1984) [hereinafter Bankers Trust 1] ("Because commercial paper
falls within the plain language of the [Glass-Steagall] Act, and because the inclusion of
commercial paper within the terms of the Act is fully consistent with the Act's purposes,
we conclude that commercial paper is a 'security' under the Glass-Steagall Act.").
1' Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) [hereinafter Bankers
Trust I]; see Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450
U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (Section 21 is not intended to bar banking practices permitted by §
16.). See generally United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955). Under the rule of
Menasche, a statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a way that would nullify the
effect of another provision. Id. at 538-39. Thus, the permissive language of § 16 must
be read consistently with the prohibitive language of § 21. Bankers Trust II,807 F.2d
at 1057-58.
11Id. at 1058.
60 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982).
61 Bankers Trust II,807 F.2d at 1058-59.
Id. at 1067; see infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
63 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1059-60; see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
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Bankers Trust did not prevent the placement from being upon

the order of the customer. 64
1. Not for the Bank's Account
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act requires that "the busi-

ness of dealing in securities and stock by the [national bank]
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and
stock
in no case for [the bank's] own account.' '65 In reviewing Bankers Trust's current practices,6 the FRB relied upon the

bank's description of its activities, 67 as well as the agency's own

Bankers Trust HI, 807 F.2d at 1060-62; see mfra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
6 12 U.S.C. at § 24 (Seventh); see note 54 and accompanying text.
" Bankers Trust's placement methods had changed since the FRB first reviewed
the bank's commercial paper activities. See generally September 1980 Statement, supra
note 25, at 84, 749. Upon second hearing of the- case, the FRB found that Bankers
Trust's prior
practice of extending short-term credit to issuers of commercial paper
placed by the bank to cover unsold portions of the issue at rates of interest
equal to or near the rates borne by the commercial paper [was] the
economic equivalent of buying some of the unsold issue with the banks
own funds.
June 1985 Statement, supra note 34, at 90,823-824. The purpose of this practice by
Bankers Trust was to bolster the efficiency of the placement service. Id. at 90,826. The
bank would decide at the end of the selling day whether or not to extend credit to the
issuer when the degree of success of the bank's placement efforts became known. Id.
Because most maturing commercial paper is paid off through a process called rolling,
in which new paper is sold to raise capital to pay off maturing paper, most issuers of
commercial paper keep such lines of credit available in the event paper sales fall below
the needed quota. M. SnouM, supra note 9, at 632.
6 See June 1985 Statement, supra note 34, at 90,824 ("According to the description
of its activities in the material submitted to the FRB, Bankers Trust's current method
of placing commercial paper differs significantly from its prior method.").
Bankers Trust has discontinued its prior practice of lending short-term
funds to issuers of paper the bank places, at or near the rate of interest
of the commercial paper being placed, taking back a commercial paper
note. Neither Bankers Trust nor any affiliated company purchases or
repurchases commercial paper placed by the bank. The bank does not
inventory commercial paper overnight, takes no ownership interest in the
paper being placed, and, contrary to its prior practice, does not make
loans on the paper it places or otherwise take the paper as collateral for
loans. Bankers Trust enters into no repurchase agreement, endorsement,
or other guarantee arrangement with the purchasers of commercial paper
placed by the bank.
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assumptions regarding Bankers Trust's loan activities. 61 On appeal, the Bankers Trust II court rejected an argument by SIA
that these assumptions amounted to agency regulation inconsis69
tent with Supreme Court precedent.
In the June 1985 statement, the FRB assumed that any loans
extended by Bankers Trust to the issuer under a line of credit
took place "under different terms, at different times, and for
different purposes than if the bank had purchased unsold commercial paper for resale."1 70 The FRB also assumed that Bankers
Trust provided no letter of credit to support issues of paper
placed by the bank. 7' To help banks comply with the "terms,
times, and purposes" requirement, the FRB "suggested" 72 that
a bank should keep records to demonstrate that credit to issuers
was extended independently of the bank's commercial paper
activities.7 3 A bank should also generally "assure itself" that
funds advanced under a line of credit were not "used to repay
any commercial paper of the issuer placed by the bank or to
cover an unsold portion of a commercial paper issue placed by
the bank. " 74 The court of appeals characterized the FRB's "reliance on such representations" as merely a determination of
"which side of the prohibitory line" factual situations fall, 75 and
76
not as agency regulation.
mnfra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
Trust 11, 807 F.2d at 1067 (SIA "argues that the Board's reliance on
such representations amounts to 'regulation' in a statute that Congress meant to operate
through 'flat prohibitions.' Tins argument is without merit."); see supra note 56 and
accompanying text, The Supreme Court has also observed that "Congress rejected the
view of those who preferred legislation that simply would regulate the underwriting
activities of commercial banks." Bankers Trust 1, 468 U.S. at 147.
70June 1985 Statement, supra note 34, at 90,026.
71 Id.
at 90,027 n.13 ("The Board's analysis is premised on the assumption that
Bankers Trust does not provide its letter of credit to support a particular issue of
commercial paper placed by the bank, as is sometimes the practice in the commercial
paper market.").
7
The term "suggested" is used here-because of the ambiguity inherent in the text
of the FRB opimon concermng these points. The FRB uses the language "[t]o this end
it would be reasonable to expect
" in reference to the statement discussed infra at
text accompanying note 73. Id. at 90,026. The FRB also uses the language "it would be
appropriate and necessary for the bank to assure itself" in reference to the statement
quoted mnfra at test accompanying note 74. Id. at 90,027
"See

9Bankers

71 Id.

at 90,026-27.

Id. at 90,027.
73 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1067.
76 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74
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While Bankers Trust 11 specifically prohibits commercial
banks that place commercial paper from engaging in lending
practices economically equivalent to purchasing unsold portions
of an issue on the bank's own account, the decision fails to
clearly establish what lending arrangements do fall within this
prohibition. One is left only to surmise that bank lines of credit
and letters of credit are prohibited for purposes of backing a
commercial paper issue, as the court merely "assumes" Bankers
Trust was not engaging in these practices. 77 With respect to other
loan arrangements, the distinction between bank credit that replaces commercial paper as the corporation's financing medium,
and bank credit that supports an issue of commercial paper, 78
remains blurred at best. Ultimately, the records requirement
adopted by the FRB will ensure that credit is extended independently of commercial paper activities.
2.

Without Recourse

Although not addressed by the Bankers Trust 11 court, section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act requires that banks may only
sell securities "without recourse" to themselves. 79 A brief discussion of this provision will facilitate a broader understanding
of section 16.

" The Bankers Trust 11 decision neither expressly approved nor prohibited bank
lines of credit and letters of credit. See supra notes 67, 71 and accompanying text. See
Bankers Trust 11, 807 F.2d at 1052.

Bankers Trust has, since the Supreme Court decided [SIA I], adopted a
policy of providing no back-up credit or guarantees to facilitate the accep-

tance of commercial paper; any line of credit now granted to an issuer
must have substantially different timing, terms, conditions and maturities
from the commercial paper being placed.
Id., 807 F.2d at 1067.
" Issuers generally back their commercial paper with lines of credit for two

reasons. First, because an "adverse turn in events" might make it very difficult for the
issuer to sell new paper to retire maturing paper, a bank line of credit reduces the risk
of loss to both issuer and investor. M. SroIUM, supra note 9, at 632. For example, when
Penn Central went bankrupt, the company had $82 million in commercial paper outstanding. Id. Second, investors will only buy commercial paper backed by a bank line

of credit. Id. For an informative discussion of credit practices used m connection with
commercial paper, see generally Hurley, The Commercial PaperMarket Since the Mid-

Seventies, 68 FED. RrsERv BuLL. 327 (1982).
71

12 U.S.C. at § 24 (Seventh).

BANKERS TRUST II

1987-88]

Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act limits bank securities
dealings to the buying and the selling of securities "without
recourse." 80 In 1935, the Supreme Court in Awotin v Atlas
Exchange Bank,81 construed section 16 as a "prohibition of
liability, whatever its form, by way of 'recourse' growing out of
' 82
the transaction of the business.
Today, some commentators interpret the "without recourse"
provision as shifting the risk of secondary liability on the security
investment to the investor.8 3 The FRB has held, without contradiction by the Supreme Court, that the "without recourse"
provision in section 16 prohibits a bank from assuming the
liability of endorser or maker with respect to the securities the
bank buys and sells as an agent for its customer. 84 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has followed the FRB position on this
matter.85
3.

On the Order of Customers

Under section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks are limited
to purchasing and to selling securities "solely upon the order
of .
customers. " 6 In Bankers Trust II, the court of
appeals, through an analysis of two separate questions, 87 held

80 Id.

1 Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Bank, 295 U.S. 209 (1935).
82 Id. at 214.
" See Ianm, supra note 50, at 106.
Order Approving Acquisition of Retail Discount Brokerage Firm, 69 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 105, 115 n.50 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
" See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
716 F.2d 92, 100 n.4 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) ("[W]e do not think
that Schwab trades 'without recourse' simply because it faces the kind of incidental
liability to which SIA I refers."); see also G. MuNN & F GAcrA, supra note 23, at
is a qualified endorsement by which the endorser does
994 (" 'Without recourse'
not assume the general contract of endorser specified in Section 3-414(1) of the Uniform
"). For an in depth discussion of endorser liability arising from
Commercial Code.
the use of bank countersignatures on presigned commercial paper, see Jenmngs, Corporate Commercial Paper Issued Through Banks: The Banks' Hidden Liability, 103
BANN o L.J. 563, 576 (1986) ("Unless Section 3-410 of the UCC is expressly revised
to remove the possibility for countersignatures to be acceptances, such security measures
will by themselves impose direct liability on the bank.").
12 U.S.C. at § 24.
9 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1059-62.
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that Bankers Trust had acted solely on the order of its customers.
First, the court asked whether section 16 only permits transactions as an accommodation to existing customers who use other
services of the bank .8 Second, the court asked whether the
advertisement of placement services and the solicitation of buyers
for commercial paper by Bankers Trust was solely on the order
89
of its customers.
With regard to the first question, the Bankers Trust II court
held that the Glass-Steagall Act does not require a preexisting
relationship between the bank and the customers of services
allowed under section 16 of the Act. 9° Congress intended section
16 of the Glass-Steagall Act to permit banks "to purchase and
sell investment securities for their customers to the same extent
as heretofore.''91 Prior to the enactment of the Glass-Steagall
Act, banks offered the securities brokerage services both to
individuals with an existing customer relationship and to persons
with no preexisting customer relationship with the banks.9 The
court of appeals refuted SIA's argument that section 16 was
only intended "to permit such services as had been traditionally
performed as an accommodation to preexisting customers of the
bank." 93 Since brokerage transactions to the general public ex-

" Id. at 1059.
89Id. at 1060-62.
0 Id. at 1059.
1,Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 207, 215 n.13 (quoting S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1933)) [hereinafter
Schwab].
Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1060; Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of
the Currency, 577 F Supp. 252, 255 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd per curtain, 758 F.2d 739,
740 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. dented, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986) ("[P]nor to the passage of
Glass-Steagall banks offered brokerage services to members of the general public, and
not just to existing customers."). For example, in Greenfield v. Clarence Say. Bank, 5
S.W.2d 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928), Greenfield, who had no account with the bank, "went
there for the sole purpose of purchasing bonds as an investment." Id. at 709.
- Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1060 ("SIA again reads too much into Schwab.
Since nothing in the language or legislative history of section 16 even remotely suggests
that the Act meant to freeze particular functions in place as of 1933, we decline to read
that meaning into the Act."). The SIA had based its argument upon the Supreme
Court's statement-in Schwab, 468 U.S. at 215, that "[b]anks long have arranged the
purchase and sale of securities as an accommodation to their customers." (emphasis
added). The Schwab court also stated that
the fact that section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act allows banks to engage
directly in the kind of brokerage services at issue here, to accommodate
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isted when the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, section 16 does
not require a preexisting customer relationship with regard to
commercial paper activities as well. 94
Addressing the second question, the court of appeals determined that despite the advertisement of placement services and
the solicitation of buyers of commercial paper by Bankers Trust,
paper sold by the bank occurred solely upon the order of its
customers. 95 The court reasoned that "[lit would strain credu96
lity" to assert that the bank could not make its services known.
The court further pointed out that such a construction of section
97
16 would require banks to "passively wait for orders."
At first glance, the Bankers Trust II court's ruling that
Bankers Trust acted solely upon the order of its customers seems
to conflict with the congressional policy behind the Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-Steagall Act seeks to separate "as completely
as possible commercial from investment banking."9' In addition,
Congress was concerned that maintaimng a securities-distribution
system, along with salespeople and fixed expenses, would cause
a bank to be overly concerned with profit and violate its fiduciary duties to its customers.9 The Supreme Court has recogized, however, that commercial banks dealt to some extent in

its customers, suggests that the activity was not the sort that concerned
Congress in its effort to secure the Nation's banks from the risks of the
securities market.
Schwab, 468 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
SId.

11Id. at 1060-62.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1062.

n See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 147 ("Through flat prohibition, the [GlassSteagall] Act sought to separate as completely as possible commercial from investment
banking.") (quoting Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70 (1981)).
" See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 146 ("Some legislators noted that this conflict
[between impartial advice and profits] is exacerbated by the considerable fixed cost that
a security dealer must incur to build and maintain a securities-distribution system.
'In order to be efficient a securities department had to be developed; it had to have
salesmen.
' ") (quoting 75 CoNo. REc. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley)); 75
CoNa. REc. 9911 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley) ("It was necessary in some cases
to seek for customers to become makers of securities when the needs of those customers
for long-term money were not very pressing.").
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commercial paper before the enactment of the Glass-Steagall

Act.0 Thus, Congress might have intended that such activities
should continue.' 0 ' Though concerned with the fixed expenses

that accompany a securities sales department, Congress was not
adverse to all sales of securities by banks. 10 2
B.

Private Placement as "Underwriting" or "Distributing"

Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that "national
banks shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock." 10 3
In Bankers Trust II, the court found that because "underwriting" under section 16 occurs only if a public offering is involved, 10 4 a private placement of securities does not constitute

statutory "underwriting.'"

05

Although the Glass-Steagall Act does not define "underwriter,"' 1 6 the court of appeals found Congress' understanding
of the term in the Securities Act of 1933107 "highly relevant" in

determining its definition under Glass-Steagall. 0 8 Section 2(11)
of the Securities Act defines "underwriter" as "any person who

has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security."'09 The court also asserted that the Supreme Court in

Bankers Trust I
made it very plain that the meaning of a term m other legislation passed roughly at the same time as the Glass-Steagall
Act with the shared purpose of restoring confidence in the
I- See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 160 ("The history of commercial-bank involvement in commercial paper prior to the [Glass-Steagall] Act is not well documented;
evidently, commercial banks occasionally dealt in commercial paper, but their involvement was overwhelmingly in the role of discounter rather than dealer.").
101See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
102 See supra note 93 and sources cited therein.
103 12 U.S.C. at § 24.
104 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062; see June 1985 Statement, supra note 34 at
90,823, 90,829-30.
10 See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062.
106See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-378(a)(I).
I-7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ii) (1982).
108Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1063. The court of appeals found that the
distribution between public offerings and private placements "derives support from
congressional interest embodied in contemporaneous securities legislation and reasonably
relates to concerns that the Glass-Steagall Act sought to meet." Id. at 1062.
10915 U.S.C. at § 77b(I1).
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nation's financial markets provided "considerable evidence"
of the ordinary meamng Congress attached to the same term
in the Glass-Steagall Act itself. 110

The Bankers Trust 11 court's holding that "underwriting"
under the Glass-Steagall Act connotes "public offering" may be

addressed on two levels: in relation to contemporaneous securities legislation,'
1
Act. 12

and in light of the legislative history of the

1. ContemporaneousSecurities Legislation
In support of its determination that Congress intended the
term "underwrite" in the Glass-Steagall Act and in the Securities
Act of 1933 to connote "public offering, 113 the court of appeals
cited as authority the Supreme Court's treatment of "security"
1 14
in Bankers Trust L

The Supreme Court in Bankers Trust I held that because

"considerable evidence [existed] to indicate that the ordinary
meaning of the terms 'security' and 'note' as used by the 1933
Congress encompasse[d] commercial paper,"" 5 "security" under

110Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062-63 (quoting Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at
150).
..See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 121-54 and accompanying text.
" See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062 ("[T]he Board reasonably concluded
that an 'underwriting' defeats the section 16 exemption only if it includes a public
offering; private placements therefore do not for this purpose constitute statutory 'underwriting.' ").

-24When faced with similar ambiguity surrounding the definition of the
terms "security" and "note," [t]he Court in SIA I made it very plain that
the meaning of a term in other legislation passed roughly at the same time
as the Glass-Steagall Act with the shared purpose of restoring confidence
in the nation's financial markets provided "considerable evidence" of the
"ordinary meaning" Congress attached to the same term in the GlassSteagall Act itself.
Id.

11,Bankers Trust 1, 468 U.S. at 150. The Supreme Court discussed several statutes
collectively designed to restore public confidence in financial markets, including the
Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Id. at 150-51. The Court noted
that in each of these statutes other than the Banking Act, "the definition of the term
'security' includes commercial paper, and each statute contams explicit exceptions where
Congress meant for the provisions of an Act not to apply to commercial paper." Id.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VoL. 76

the Glass-Steagall Act included commercial paper. 116 The court
of appeals in Bankers Trust 11 similarly held that the "congressional intent embodied in contemporaneous securities legislation" indicated that "underwriting" under the Glass-Steagall
Act connotes a "public offering." ' u7
The analysis of the Bankers Trust 11 court, however, differs
from that of the Bankers Trust I Court in significant ways.
While the Supreme Court supported its interpretation of "se-

curity" with "considerable evidence" contained in contemporaneous legislation, only one contemporaneous statute supporting
the court of appeals' interpretation of "underwriting" existed.",,
The Supreme Court had also cited legislative history which clearly
established that the drafters of the Glass-Steagall Act were aware
that the term "security" under the Securities Act included com-

mercial paper 119 The Bankers Trust II court provided no evidence that the same drafters were aware that the term
"underwriter" under the Securities Act connoted a "public of-

fering. "120
2.

Legislative History

In its analysis of "underwriting," the court of appeals conceded that the distinction between a private and a public
116Id. at 139-40.

Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062.
See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1063 ("Only the Securities Act of 1933 defines
the term 'underwriter'
"). The court of appeals also cited a subsequent Federal
Trade Commission finding that a "statutory 'distribution' necessarily involved a 'public
offenng,' thus making it clear that one could not be an 'underwriter' in the absence of
a public offering." Id. at 1064 (citing H.R. Corr,. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
41 (1934)). In addition, the Bankers Trust 11 court cited a subsequent commentator for
the proposition that a distribution was "more or less synonymous with" a public
offering. Id. (citing 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrris REGULATON 551 & n.307 (2d ed. 1961)); see
supra note 109 and accompanying text.
While conceding the validity of the authority used by the Bankers Trust H court,
the author nonetheless asserts that because the drafters of the Glass-Steagall were
unaware of the subsequent novel treatment of "underwriting" in the Securities Act of
1933, Congress intended "underwriting" in the Glass-Steagall Act m the term's traditional sense of insurance against risk of loss on an issue of securities. See infra notes
125-53 and accompanying text.
119See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 151 ("During the hearings on [the Securities
Act of 1933], Senator Glass expressed dissatisfaction with th[e] definition [of 'security']
because it plainly did encompass commercial paper.").
120See infra notes 125-53 and accompanying text. See generally Bankers Trust II,
807 F.2d at 1062-66.
"7

"
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offering 21 was one which "seems highly plausible that
Congress might have drawn" in section 16,122 and that the history
in support of the court's holding was "by no means conclu-

sive. )112 The court also based its holding upon the absence of
"any contrary indication." 124 Yet, evidence exists that the drafters of Glass-Steagall were unaware of the novel treatment of
"underwriting" in the Securities Act of 1933; Congress likely
intended "underwriting" under the Glass-Steagall Act in its traditional sense of incurring risk of loss on an issue of securities.
The Congress that enacted the Glass-Steagall Act and. the
Securities Act of 1933 had little understanding of the legislation
they voted, upon. Congress passed the Securities Act and the
Glass-Steagall Act during the famous Hundred Days of the
Roosevelt Admmistration, 25 a fourteen-week period during which
fifteen statutes were enacted.I 26 As one commentator points out,
[o]nly a handful of individuals participated actively in writing
the Emergency Banking Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
the National Recovery Act, or the Securities Act. Few legislators understood fully the details of any two pieces of legislation
passed during the Hundred Days. Senator Carter Glass was
typical. He made a brief appearance at the House-Senate conference on the Securities Act. When informed that the bill did
not mention the Federal Reserve Board, he left and never
returned. 27

-

"I See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
M Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).
I" Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).

Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
supra note 45, at 112.
116Id. From March 9, 1933 through June 16, 1933, Congress enacted the Emergency
Banking Act (March 9) and the Economy Act (March 20); established the Civilian
Conservation Corps (March 31); abandoned the gold standard (April 19); enacted the
Federal Emergency Relief Act (May 12), the Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 12), the
Emergency Farm Mortgage Act (May 12), the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (May 18),
and the Truth-m-Securities Act (May 27); abrogated the gold clause in public and in
private contracts (June 5); enacted the Home Owners' Loan Act (June 13), the National
Industrial Recovery Act (June 16), the Glass-Steagall Banking Act (June,,16), the Farm
Credit Act (June 16), and the Railroad Coordination Act (June 16). A. SCHLSMINGER,
TAE CoMG oF THE NEw DEAL 20-21 (1959).
27 M. PARRIsH, supra note 45, at 112. Senator Glass was, however, acquainted
with the provision of the Securities Act relating to "security," as he raised objections
to this provision in hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 151-52 (quoting Securities Act: Hearings on S.875 before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 98, 120 (1933)).
17A

'25M. PARRISH,
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Of the Senate Committee Hearings on the Securities Act held

March 31, 1933, to April 8, 1933, Glass attended only one day,
Monday, April 3.128
Although the Glass-Steagall Act was signed into law by
President Roosevelt over two weeks after the Securities Act of
1933,129 Glass-Steagall was actually developed under the Hoover
adminstration.1 0 The Senate had approved the Glass Bill over
a month before even the earlier versions of the Securities Act

had been drafted. Hearings on the Glass Bill took place before
the Glass Banking and Currency subcommittee in the winter of

1931 and before the full comnttee a year later.' 3' The Glass
Banking Bill was introduced to the Senate on April 18, 1932,132
and approved by the Senate on January 25, 1933.133 Roosevelt
121 Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1933) ("Present: Senators Fletcher (chairman), Glass,
Wagner, Barkley, Bulkley, Gore, Byrnes, Adams, Norbeck, Goldsborough, Townsend,
Carey, Stelwer, and Kean."). Adding to the lack of knowledge among members of
Congress was an agreement among the members of the House subcommittee on the
Securities Act that "no publicity of any nature would be given to [the Act] until a draft
satisfactory to the subcommittee was reported out to the full committee." Landis,
Legislative History of the Securities Act, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 29, 38 (1959-60).
129See

supra note 45.

R. MoLEY, Tim FmsT NEw DEAL 317 (1966).
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 can hardly be classed as a New Deal
measure. Roosevelt was sympathetic, but had no active part in pressing
for its passage. Most of the people who were close to the White House m
April and May were so busy with their own legislative programs that Glass
was left to his own devices.
Id., Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKwIN L.J. 483 (1971).
IN]either of the two main features of [the Banking Act of 1933], the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guaranteeing bank deposits nor the
section requiring all banking institutions to restrict their future business
activities either
commercial banking or
investment banking functions, was really sponsored by the new admimstration. They were instead
holdover programs initiated by Democratic legislators in prior Congresses.
Id.
131 Perkins, supra note 130, at 505-06 ("Hearings on the Glass Banking Bill were
held on two occasions; once before the Banking and Currency subcommittee chaired by
Senator Glass in the winter of 1931 and then again one year later before the full
committee.").
130

132 H.

BuRNs, THE AmzC~iAN BANKIG CommuNrrY AND NEw D.AL BANXNO

REFORMs 1933-1935 17 (1974) ("Opposition continued and additional redrafting took
place. This resulted in a third [Glass] bill which was introduced [to the Senate] on April
18.").
1" Perkins, supra note 130, at 521.
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was sworn into office on March 4, 1933.134 Preoccupation in
House of Representatives in the final days of the Hoover
numstration delayed the enactment of the Glass Bill, wich
not gain final passage until Glass agreed to incorporate

Steagall Bill'35 (the basis for the F.D.I.C.) into his own.

the
addid
the

36 Pres-

ident Roosevelt signed the Glass-Steagall Act into law on June

16, 1933. 137
The Securities Act of 1933 resulted from the work of Huston
Thompson, former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,

and Felix Frankfurter, later a Justice of the Umted States Supreme Court. 138 Thompson drafted his version of the Securities
Act in the days surrounding March 19, 1933,139 well after the
January 25 adoption of the Glass Bill by the Senate. The first

draft of the Frankfurter version, which replaced the Thompson
version, was produced on April 8, 1933.140 The April 29 draft

of the Frankfurter version was introduced in the House of
Representatives on May 3 and passed on May 5, 1933.141 President Roosevelt signed the Securities Act of 1933 into law on
May 27, 1933.142

S. KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 152.
' The Steagall Bill, which provided for a guarantee fund on deposits for banks,

"3

was introduced by Congressman Steagall on April 14. H. BuNs, supra note 132, at 18.
I3 See id. at 17 ("The passage of [the Glass Bill] through the Senate was to be
long and stormy. It was eventually approved and sent to the House of Representatives.
"); id. at 32 ("Reports circulated that last minute House action would be
taken on the Glass banking bill. President Hoover, in a final plea to Congress, urged
its passage, but no recommendation was made by the president-elect. The bill remained
in committee."); Perkins, supra note 130, at 522 (The delay in acting on the Glass Bill
resulted from "preoccupation in the spnng of 1933 with the possible effects of two even
more ormnous threats
the movements that lead to the creation of the F.D.I.C. and
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933.").
"' See supra note 45.
' See M. PAxRiS, supra note 45, at 42-48.
"' See id. at 46-47 ("Miller and Butler prepared the first draft of possible legislation. Thompson studied the measure for several days
[and]
presented the
proposed bill to FDR
on March 19.
Roosevelt told the press on March 21 that
securities legislation would soon be introduced.").
" See id. at 57 ("Roosevelt, informed of the deteriorating situation, eased Thompson out of the picture by persuading him to oversee pending government litigation
against Muscle Shoals power companies and Henry Ford. By Saturday night, April 8,
the Frankfurter group had produced a new bill.").
141 See id. at 66 (The second House subcommittee print of April 29 was basically
the bill Rayburn formally introduced on May 3 and the House passed on May 4.).
,,2 See supra note 45.
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The drafters of the Securities Act took a novel approach to
"underwriting." Before the enactment of the Securities Act, the
financial commumty understood the term "underwriting" in the
insurance sense, as one who takes the risk of loss on an issue
of securities by obligating himself to purchase all unsubscribed
securities.1 43 The term "distribution" therefore had a meamng
separate from "underwriting." 144 Similarly, the Glass-Steagall
Act's prohibitions also represent "a general policy against cominvestment or speculative nsks," 145
mercial banks assuming .
in addition to contaimng separate prohibitions against "underwriting" and "distribution."

146

In contrast, the terms "underwriting" and "distribution"
have been viewed as substantially synonomous with "public
offering" under the Securities Act of 1933.147 In Securities In-

141 Gourrich, Investment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the SecuritiesAct of
1933, 4 LAw & CoNnmp. PRoBs. 44, 49 (1937).
The banking group was frequently formed about the same time as, or prior
to, the formation of a selling group. It distributed the risks assumed by
the purchase group over a larger number of firms than the ten or fifteen,
and sometimes less, who participated in such purchase groups. This funcby this banking group agreeing to take up
tion might be performed
any securities which the purchase group might fail to sell to or through
the selling group; i.e., -"underwrite" such sale.
Id. Douglas & Bates, The.Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 201-02
("Sound underwriting requires that the risk be so spread that all who participate will be
able to bear it conservatively.").
'14See Gourrich, supra note 143, at 46.
Investment bankers' participation in the distribution of new securities has
taken two major forms: (1) the distribution of securities to the public after
the banker has purchased the issue from the issuer, or received an option
thereon, or with the, banker acting as selling agent; (2) the "underwriting"
of an offering of securities by a corporation to its security holders, by
which the banker obligates himself to purchase all unsubscribed securities.
Id.
14, Ianm, supra note 50, at 100; see 12 U.S.C. at § 24 ("The business of dealing
without
in securities
shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities
recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for
its own account.") (emphasis added); Gourrich,.supra note 143, at 49 (During syndication
prior to the Securities Act, the "banking" group, who functioned to "underwrite" the
sale, was responsible for bearing the risks of the trading account in the new issue.).
orgamor,.
I- See 12 U.S.C. at § 21(a)(1) (It is unlawful "for any person
to
zation, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing
engage
m the business of receiving deposits.").
117"Since 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1I), defines an 'underwriter' as 'any person who
distribution of any security' and since
has purchased from an issuer with a view to
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dustry Association v Board of Governorsof the FederalReserve
System [Schwab], the Supreme Court noted that "[ifn the typical
distribution of securities, an underwriter purchases securities
these securities to the
[and distributes]
from an issuer
14
public.'
The Securities Act therefore effected a change in the
scope of the term "underwriter" from its common meaning in
financial circles. 149 "Underwriter" expanded from one who bore

the risk of loss on an issue of securities, to anyone who sold
securities in connection with a distribution. Because the distribution of securities is much like merchandising, 50 "underwriter"
under the Securities Act includes not only the bankers who bear

any risks of the trading account in the new issue, but also those
who merely pass the security along without incurring any risk
on the issue.' 5 ' The Securities Act represents a general policy of

the question is whether there was a
a 'distribution' requires a 'public offering'
'public offering' " Gilligan, Wills & Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 267 F.2d 461,
466 (2d Cir. 1959); see Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purna, 346 U.S. 119,
125 (1953) ("An offering to those who are shown to fend for themselves is a transaction
'not involving any public offering.' "). The determination of who is an "underwriter"
under the Securities Act is important because "[u]nderwriters are subject to civil liability
under [section] 11 [of the Securities Act] for deficiencies in the registration statement."
L. Loss, supra note 118, at 547.
2, Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217 n.17 (quoting L. Loss, supra note 118, at 172).
",See Orrick, Regulation Problems Under the Federal Securities Act: Resales
Following Rule 133 and Exchange Transactions, 10 HAI niGs L.J. 1, 4 (1968) ("In the
context of the Securities Act, the term 'underwriter' has a scope far broader than its
common meaning in financial parlance."); see also Douglas & Bates, supra note 143, at
198-99 ("The introduction into the [Securities Act] of the business term 'underwriter'
necessitated definition, and the definition employed includes many more persons than
have hitherto been comprehended in that term."); id. at 202 n.173 ("Itis hardly possible
").
that 'distributors' would be interpreted as being synonymous with 'underwriters'
For a contemporaneous discussion of the various functions of "underwriters", see
generally Douglas & Bates, Some Effects of the SecuritiesAct upon Investment Banking,
I U. Cm. L. Rnv 283 (1933).
M'L. Loss, supra note 118, at 164.
The issuer simply sells the entire issue outright to a group of securities
firms, represented by one or several "managers" or "principal underwri[who] in turn sell at a price differential to
ters" or "representatives"
[who] sell at another differential
a larger "selling group" of dealers
to the public. In a very limited sense the process is comparable to the
merchandising of beans or automobiles or baby rattles.
Id.

1S1See Douglas & Bates, supra note 143, at 199 n.159 ("[E]ven its broadest usage
[underwriting] does not encompass all those included under the [Securities] Act-such,
for example, as the small retail dealer who solicits and confirms orders in a security for
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providing investors with complete, material information about

securities offered for public sale and protecting investors from
misrepresentation and other fraudulent practices in the sale of
152
securities.

In summation, before the Securities Act of 1933, the financial community understood "underwriter" as one who took the
risk of loss on an issue by obligating himself to purchase unsubscribed securities. Because the drafting of the Glass-Steagall Act
occurred prior to the enactment of the Securities Act and because

Congress enacted a very large volume of legislation during the
Hundred Days, the drafters of the Glass-Steagall Act were likely
unaware of the novel treatment of "underwriting" in the Secu-

rities Act of 1933. Thus, the drafters likely intended "underwriter" as was generally understood before the Securities Act:
as one who assumed the risk of loss on an issue by committing
to purchase unsubscribed securities.'-"

an issuer at a small commission without taking any commitment in the security.")
(emphasis added).
112 See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124 ("The design of the [Securities Act] is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to
informed investment decisions."); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941) ("The aim
of the Securities
Act is to protect the public by requiring that it be furnished with adequate information
upon which to make investments."); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. at § 77a) ("To provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails,
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."); Orrick, supra note
149, at 4 ("The basic concept of the Securities Act is to require registration of securities
offered for sale in interstate commerce by issuers, underwriters or dealers unless some
exemption is available.").
M'The author's theory follows from the fact that the Glass-Steagall Act was drafted
before the Securities Act, see supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text; from the fact
that Senator Glass was generally unaware of the provisions of the Securities Act save
those dealing with "security," see supra notes 119, 125-28 and accompanying text; from
the massive amount of legislation that was hurriedly sent through Congress during the
Hundred Days period, see supra note 126 and accompanying text; from the the general
emphasis of the Glass-Steagall Act against commercial banks assuming investment related
risks, see supra note 145; and from the fact that "underwriter" before the enactment
of the Securities Act of 1933 connoted one who assumed the risk of loss by committing
to purchase all unsubscribed securities. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. For
an opposing viewpoint, see Glidden, Bank Sales of CommercialPaper Under the GlassSteagall Act: The Hazards of the Bankers Trust Decisions,42 Bus. LAw 1, 19-26 (198687). For an overview of "underwriting" under the Glass-Steagall Act, see generally
Note, Securities Activities Under the Glass-SteagallAct, 35 EMoRY L.J. 464 (1986).
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The precise definition of "underwriter" becomes critical when
determimng when credit arrangements between banks and issuers
occur "on the bank's own account.' 5 4 The Bankers Trust 11
decision leaves unresolved the validity of loan arrangements
between a bank and an issuer of commercial paper the bank
does not place. Under the court of appeals approach, a corporation could theoretically have its commercial paper placed by
one bank and backed with a line of credit from another, since
no distribution occurs. The bank extending the credit would not
be engaging in "the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or
distributing" securities so the general prohibitions of section 21
of the Glass-Steagall Act would not apply If "underwriter"
were understood in its classic insurance sense, as was the likely
intent of the drafters of the Act, then Glass-Steagall would
prohibit any extension of credit economically equivalent to purchasing unsold portions of an issue on the bank's own account,
because the bank would be incurring the risk of loss on an issue
of securities. A corporation would thus be precluded from placing its commercial paper through one bank, and backing the
paper with a line of credit through another
C. Private Placement and the Subtle Hazards Analysis
The final step of the court of appeals' analysis of Bankers
Trust's activities under the Glass-Steagall Act concerned the
application of the "subtle hazards" public policy analysis 55 developed by the Supreme Court in Investment Company Institute
v Camp. 56 The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act
reveals that in addition to the obvious risk that a bank could
lose money by imprudent investment of its funds in speculative
securities, Congress also sought to address "the more subtle
hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the
business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the
investment banking business."' 5 7 The Camp decision outlined
potential conflicts of interest that may arise as a result of the

"
"'

See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1066-70.
401 U.S. 617 (1971).

'" Id. at 630.
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combination of these two industries. 15s In Bankers Trust II, the
court of appeals discussed the impact of Bankers Trust's place-

ment of commercial paper on the bank's role as an impartial
source of credit, 159 and on the bank's fiduciary role as a disin-

terested advisor.I 60
1. Bank's Role as an ImpartialSource of Credit
The court of appeals first addressed the potential conflicts
of interest involved when a bank loans funds to an issuer of

commercial paper the bank is placing. 16' The court held that
Bankers Trust's private placement activities did not conflict with
the bank's role as an impartial source of credit because the
commission earned on the placement was too small to warrant
making an unsound loan.i 62 The court found that the placement

The catalogue of "subtle hazards" outlined in Camp includes the following:
1. the danger that banks might invest their own assets in "frozen or
otherwise imprudent stock or security investments";
2. the creation of "promotional" pressures on banks that rmght tempt
them to shore up, through unsound loans or other aid, an affiliate engaged
in the securities business;
3. the danger that public confidence in a bank rmght be impaired if
its security affiliate fared badly;
4. the danger that banks rmght make their credit facilities more freely
available-or that unsound loans might be made-to companies in whose
securities the banks' affiliates had invested;
5. the danger that the bank depositors might suffer losses on the
investments they purchased in reliance on the relationship between the bank
and its security affiliate;
6. the danger that banks' reputations "for prudence and restraint"
rmght be undercut if they were to assume the "nsks necessarily incident
to the investment banking business";
7. the danger that banks might make loans to customers to facilitate
the purchase of securities in which the banks had the interest of an
investment banker; and
8. the "conflict between the promotional interest of the investment
banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested
investment advice"-in particular, the danger that bank trust departments
might be used to "unload excessive holdings" of security affiliates.
J. HAWKE, JR., supra note 23, at 170-71 n.1 (1985) (quoting Camp, 401 U.S. at 630"'

34).
", Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1067-68.
161Id. at 1068-69.
161See id. at 1066.
16,Id. at 1068.
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of commercial paper "will not lead to the lending of money to
'shore up' customers of the bank's commercial paper service.' 1 63

Such reasoning does not accord with standard industry practice.
The commercial paper market is predominantly a wholesale
market. 164 While issuers sell commercial paper in amounts as

small as $25,000 to $50,000 to individuals and small firms, most
issuers require a mimmum denomnnation of $100,000.16 Distribution of commercial paper in amounts exceeding $1,000,000
occurs frequently.'6 Dealers charge a standard fee of 1/8 of one
percent for the private placement, which brings the bank ap-

proximately $3.47 per one-million dollars worth of commercial
paper placed per day 167 Rating sevices determine the quality of
the commercial paper by conferring a rating which indicates the
"relative repayment capacity of rated issuers.' 1 68 Paper backed.
by letters of credit from banks and insurance companies or paper
guaranteed by parent compames usually receives a rating equiv-

alent to the rating agency's assessment of the bank or the guarantor. 169 Because issuers receive the rating of the bank or the

guarantor, the quality of their rating is directly proportional to
the amount of credit a company has available. 170 Banks, there-

163Id.
"I

M. STnoum, supra note 9, at 625-26.

16 Id.

16 Id.
"1 Id. at 639; see Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1068.
I" See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S BOND RECORD, 122 (Feb. 1988).
"Five ratings services currently evaluate commercial paper: Moody's Investors Service;
Standard & Poor's Corporation; Fitch Investors Service; Duff and Phelps, Inc., and
McCarthy, Cnsantt, Maffei, Inc." Hurley, supra note 78, at 331.
19 "In assigmng ratings to" issuers whose "Commercial Paper obligations are
supported by another entity or entities,
Moody's evaluates the financial strength of
the indicated affiliated corporations, commercial banks, insurance companies, foreign
governments or other entities, but only as one factor in the total rating assessment."
MOODY'S INVEsTORS SERVICE, supra note 168, at 122.
170

Id.

Issuers rated Prime-] (or related supporting institutions) have a superior
capacity for repayment of short-term promissory obligations. Prime-i repayment capacity will normally be evidenced by the following characteristics:
-Leading market positions in well established industries.
-High rates of return on funds employed.
-Conservative capitalization structures with moderate reliance on debt
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fore, have a strong incentive to offer such credit to support an
issue; the bank gets a fee for the placement, and the extension

of credit enhances the marketability of the paper placed by the
bank.171 Banks also benefit from the continued patronage and
the repeat business generated by dealing in short-term paper.

Because investors will only purchase commercial paper backed
by lines of credit, entry into the commercial paper market is

nearly conditioned upon a bank's extension of credit. 7 2 Finally,
because a smaller sales staff is needed to sell higher grades of
paper, banks benefit from the reduced labor costs produced by
the high paper ratings that accompany bank lines of credit. 7 3
2.

Bank's FiduciaryRole as DisinterestedAdvisor

The Bankers Trust H court also discussed two "subtle hazards" that concern the bank's fiduciary role as a disinterested
advisor. 174 First, the possibility exists that "the bank will give
unsound financial advice to the issuer in order to reap the profits
from placement of the issuer's commercial paper."'' 75 The court
of appeals ruled that this possibility was "insignificant" because

and ample asset protection.
-Broad margins in earnings coverage of fixed financial charges and high
internal cash generation.
-Well established access to a range of financial markets and assured
sources of alternateliquidity.
Id. (emphasis added). Moody's Bond Record rates commercial paper according to four
categories: Prime-1, Pnme-2, Pnme-3 and Not Prime. Under such rating system, issuers
receive one of the three prime ratings only if "[a]mple alternate liquidity is maintained."
MOODY'S INvasrTOs SERvicE, supra note 168, at 122. See M. Snoum, supra note 9, at
632 ("[One reason] issuers pay to acquire bank lines [of credit] is that investors will buy
only paper backed by bank lines.
Most issuers attempt to maintain 100% line
backing for their paper.
"); Jennings, supra note 84, at 576 ("In order to get a
rating on commercial paper from Moody's Investor's Service or Standard & Poor's
Creditweek, it is necessary for corporate commercial paper to be 'backed up' by a line
of credit by a bank.").
"I See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 155.
'7

See supra note 78.

See M. Snourm, supra note 9, at 643 ("A firm with a top credit rating can sell
a huge amount of commercial paper through a small sales force-three to six people.").
"' Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1068-69.
,7 Id. at 1068.
'"
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the low profit from the placement would not justify the potential
damage to the bank's reputation and goodwill caused by the
bank giving "deliberately unsound advice."' 176
Second, the Bankers Trust II court addressed the possibility
that depositors purchasing securities through the bank might lose
confidence if an issuer using the bank's securities services defaulted. 77 Here, the court disagreed with the FRB's argument
that the sophisticated business investors who buy commercial
paper "would be unlikely to blame their bank for what really
amounts to [the investor's] own error in judgment. 178 The
Supreme Court in Bankers Trust I held that the Glass-Steagall
Act makes no distinctions on the basis of financial expertise and
that the loss of confidence of a few large depositors "would be
especially severe."' 79 The court of appeals concluded "that despite the existence of this one 'subtle hazard,' it must still affirm
the FRB decision."' 180
CONCLUSION

The impact of Bankers Trust II on the banking community
cannot be overstated. The industry is desperately seeking new
measures and new products to bolster its ever decreasing profits.
With regard to congressional intent to "separate as completely
as possible commercial from investment banking,"''
allowing
commercial banks to place commercial paper significantly weakens the Glass-Steagall wall between the two industries. In addition, the court of appeals decision leaves several questions
unanswered.
First, the scope of the permssible extension of credit by a
bank to an issuer of paper placed by the bank remains undefined. The FRB and the court of appeals addressed this issue

Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1069.
17 Id.
t7 See Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 156.
"
Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1069.
"
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 137, 147 (1984) (quoting Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment
Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 70 (1981)).
"'

'
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with only vague language, thus leaving the business community
182
to interpret only "assumptions" and "suggestions."

Second, while Bankers Trust I1holds that "underwriting"
under the Glass-Steagall Act connotes "public offering," evidence exists suggesting that the drafters of Glass-Steagall in-

tended "underwriting" to connote incurring risk of loss on an
issue of securities.183 Congress may very well revise the GlassSteagall Act before the Supreme Court has an opportunity to

reconcile this discrepancy
Finally, in applying the Camp "subtle hazards" analysis, the

Bankers Trust 11 court found that a hazard occurred without
finding a statutory violation.' 4 The court expressed reservation
as to the validity of the "subtle hazards" analysis, 85 but until
the Supreme Court decides to the contrary, courts must continue
to use the Camp test to analyze activities under the Glass-Steagall
Act.

Bankers Trust II allows banks to go one step further into
the securities industry The fate of the Glass-Steagall Act itself

is uncertain, as FRB Chairman Greenspan has called for its
repeal. 8 6 As was aptly summarized by retired FRB Chairman

-See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-54 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
iB See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 807
F.2d 1052, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) (The "subtle
hazards" approach "admittedly seems at odds with the recent statement by the Supreme
Court that 'application of broad purposes of legislation at the expense of specific
provisions ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address
and the dynamics of legislative action.' "); see also H. BLooENT EAL,SEcUrrsas LAW
HANDBOOK, 16 (1987) ("Several justices may share Judge Bork's skepticism about the
appropriateness of the 'subtle hazard' approach.").
"

136

The Federal Reserve Board called today for repeal of [the Glass-Steagall
Act] enacted during the Depression that places a barrier between the
banking and securities industries.
Testifying before a House banking
subcommittee, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
said the central bank wanted commercial banks to be able to engage in the
broadest range of securities underwriting.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1. For general discussions concermng Glass-Steagall
reform, see Note, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A ProposalForthe Reform of GlassSteagall, 52 BRooxiyx L. R-v. 281 (1986-87); Goodwin, Fifty-Two Years After the GlassSteagallAct: Do Commercial Bank Securities Activities Merit a Second Look?, 1984 DET.
C. L. Rav 933 (1984).
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Volcker, "[c]ongressional action is needed in order to provide a
firm foundation of specifically applicable new law for the conduct of [commercial paper placement], as well as to provide the
Board with full authority to establish the necessary prudential
87
framework."
Richard Douglas Martin

'" June 1985 Statement, supra note 34, at 90,837 (concurring statement of Chairman Volcker).

